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  Professor of Law, Cornell University.  I am grateful for the comments and suggestions of participants in*
the “Professional Ethics and Personal Integrity” conference at the University of Auckland, where a version of this
paper was presented, to Ben Zipursky for helpful criticism, and to Daniel Markovits for responding to a draft of the
paper and for ongoing discussion of his project.  
  Here I am using the term “value” in Scanlon’s buck-passing sense of something’s having properties that1
provide reasons for behaving in certain ways in regard to that thing.  See T.M. SCANLON , WHAT WE OWE TO EACH
OTHER 96 (1998).  
1
Personal Integrity and the Conflict Between Ordinary and Institutional Values
W. Bradley Wendel*
I. Two Distinctions in Legal Ethics:  Ordinary and Institutional Values and Agent-Neutral
and Agent-Relative Reasons.
Values, which give us reasons for acting in certain ways, may be properties of both
“natural,” pre-institutional states of affairs and relations among persons, as well as states of
affairs and relations among persons that are constituted and regulated by social and political
institutions.   We can call these ordinary moral values and institutional values, respectively. 1
Ordinary moral values give reasons for all persons to do something or refrain from doing
something.  For instance, the value of human dignity gives all persons a reason to avoid
humiliating others, and the value of truthfulness gives a reason not to lie.  By contrast,
institutional values give reasons only for those persons who work within an institution, or who
may be described as having “opted in” to a particular social role — say, that of soldier, monk,
judge, or lawyer.  The value of impartiality is a reason for a judge to set aside her prejudices and
decide a case on the merits, even though there may be nothing wrong, in ordinary moral terms,
with believing that a person said by the police to have committed a crime is in fact guilty. 
Conversely, the value of partiality is associated with the role of lawyer in a client-centered,
common-law legal system, in which litigated disputes are framed by the pleadings and legal
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024313
  Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE2
L.J. 1060 (1976).
  See Daniel Markovits, Legal Ethics from the Lawyer’s Point of View, 15 YALE J. L. &  HUM AN . 209, 2123
(2003) (“adversary lawyers commonly do, and indeed are often required to do, things in their professional capacities,
which, if done by ordinary people in ordinary circumstances, would be straightforwardly immoral”).  
  See SISSELA BOK, LYING:  MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 13 (1978).4
  See, e.g., John Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts are Where You Find Them , 1 GEO . J.  LEGAL ETHICS 3395
(1987).
2
arguments of the parties.  From the institutional point of view, a lawyer or judge is expected to
act on the basis of a restricted or role-specific set of moral values, as compared with the values
that would inform the actions of a similarly situated non-professional.  
The fundamental issue in legal ethics is often represented as a conflict between ordinary
moral values and institutional values.  As Charles Fried famously put it, “Can a good lawyer be a
good person?”   As this question suggests, there may be actions permitted or mandated by a2
professional role that would be evaluated as moral wrongdoing if taken by a non-professional.  3
Consider a mundane example such as impeaching the testimony of an adverse witness the lawyer
knows (or at least has very compelling reasons to believe) is telling the truth.  In ordinary moral
terms, the lawyer has engaged in deception, defined as attempting to create a belief in others that
is at variance with one’s own belief about the truth of the matter.   From an institutional4
standpoint, however, the lawyer has contributed to a process that seeks to determine liability for
punishment on the basis of fair procedures that respect the dignity of the defendant and place
checks on police misconduct.  There may be no way to enforce the requirement that the state
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, without giving defense lawyers latitude to construct
accounts of events inconsistent with the guilt of their clients — that is, to engage in deception.  5
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1024313
  DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:  REFORM ING THE LEGAL PROFESSION  66-67 (2000).6
  See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM , ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES:  THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND7
PRIVATE LIFE, Ch. 5 (1999).
  See W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM . L. REV. 363 (2004).  8
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However, participating in a practice of ritualized deception designed to secure the acquittal of
one’s client, never mind the client’s factual guilt or innocence, would conflict with the moral
commitments of most people, who believe themselves to have good reasons not to act
dishonestly.  As a result, when legal ethics scholars call upon lawyers to “accept personal
responsibility for the moral consequences of their professional actions,”  lawyers are placed6
squarely in between competing institutional and ordinary moral values. 
Lawyers who wish to avoid the sting of being labeled as serial violators of moral
obligations may attempt to describe their actions solely in terms of institutional values.  As
Arthur Applbaum has argued, however, descriptions in terms of ordinary moral values persist, so
that the lawyer can be described as both a deceiver and a cog in some rights-protecting, truth-
finding process.   Given the persistence of ordinary moral descriptions, the fundamental ethical7
problem for lawyers may be reframed in terms of the priority of these two descriptions.  The
description in terms of institutional values (i.e. “vigorous cross-examination” instead of
“deception”) would be warranted in one of three situations.  First, if the institutional setting were
somehow to provide exclusionary reasons for action vis-a-vis ordinary moral values,  then the8
description in terms of institutional values would be the sole evaluative perspective from which
to judge lawyers’ actions.  Second, institutional values may be sufficiently weighty (although not
exclusionary) that a person acting in an institutional capacity may conclude that the cross-
  For the justification/excuse distinction in criminal law, see, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING9
CRIM INAL LAW  458-59 (1978); Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Border of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM . L.
REV. 1897 (1984). 
  THOM AS NAGEL, THE V IEW  FROM  NOW HERE 170 (1986) (defining agent-neutral and agent-relative10
reasons).
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examination is all-things-considered the right thing to do.  The importance of the defendant’s
right to resist the state’s attempt to deprive him of liberty may outweigh jurors’ interests in not
being deceived, and the witness’s interest in not being humiliated by the cross-examination. 
Finally, in a concession to the persistence of ordinary moral description, the lawyer may argue
that the cross-examination is not deceptive in ordinary moral terms, either on the basis of alleged
epistemological uncertainty or by appealing to shared conventions regulating the communicative
setting of trials, according to which triers of fact do not take the utterances of lawyers as
representations of their belief in the truth.  
If any of these three situations obtained, the lawyer would have a justification for what
would otherwise be a wrongful action, if described in ordinary moral terms.   Notice something9
significant about these patterns of justification:  In each of these three situations, the argument
appeals to values that are agent-neutral, in the sense that they refer to values that are
“independent of the particular perspective and system of preferences of the agent”.   The usual10
attempts to justify what would otherwise be wrongdoing by lawyers share this feature of making
reference to values that are independent of the standpoint of the actor.  It is generally taken for
granted that the lawyer’s own ideals and commitments are irrelevant, except to the extent that
they overlap with what one (impartially speaking) ought to value and be committed to.  The
value of, for example, the rights of a criminal defendant or the impartial adjudication of disputes
  See, e.g, Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:  Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public11
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1241 (1993) (observing that public defenders often become disillusioned or
burned out, despite “the nearly universal view that effective representation of indigents in criminal cases is
justified”).  Ogletree cites several accounts written by public defenders — admittedly anecdotal evidence — in
support of his claim that, “[w]hen faced with a conflict between her professional role and her visceral reaction to her
clients, the lawyer finds little solace in the philosophical arguments.”  Id. at 1242.
  See, e.g., Christine M. Korsgaard, The Reasons We Can Share:  An Attack on the Distinction Between12
Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values, in CREATING THE K INGDOM  OF ENDS 275 (1996).  
  I am grateful to Daniel Markovits for pressing me to make this distinction clear.  13
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does not depend on perspective of the lawyer herself — these things would be genuine objects of
ethical concern even if the lawyer was not committed to them.  As a result there may be a kind of
gap between an agent’s own commitments and the values which inform the professional role
within which she acts.  This gap may lead to a sense of profound moral alienation, caused by the
conflict between the impartially justified (or required) actions undertaken in a professional role
and the things she values in her ordinary life, such as truth, avoiding humiliating others, and so
on.   11
Although attempts to justify or excuse actions within professional roles generally refer to
agent-neutral values, there is a significant movement in modern ethical theory which challenges
the agent-neutral orientation of practical reasoning.  Although virtue ethics may be the most
obvious example, philosophers working within a broadly deontological orientation, such as
Bernard Williams, Thomas Nagel, and Christine Korsgaard, have also sought a more important
role for the ideals, commitments, and perspectives of particular persons.  These interests are said
to give rise to agent-relative reasons.   These commitments may be to ethical ideals, even12
understood impartially — for example, a person may make alleviating hunger or poverty into one
of her life’s goals  — but there is no necessary connection between impartial values and the13
  Samuel Scheffler, Projects, Relationships, and Reasons, in REASON AND VALUE:  THEM ES FROM THE14
MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 247, 251-52 (R. Jay Wallace, et al., eds. 2004).
  Thus, I prefer to bracket questions of whether other kinds of reasons within ethics are best understood as15
agent-neutral or agent-relative.  For example, Thomas Nagel has argued that deontological considerations are
actually agent-relative, and not the expression of neutral values of any kind.  See NAGEL, supra note ___, at 176-78. 
Explaining deontological reasons in agent-relative terms does help make sense of the intuition that a moral dilemma
is involved in cases where harm will result regardless of whether the agent causes some lesser harm.  See Korsgaard,
supra note ___, at 291-93.  Despite this advantage, I think the better approach is to understand deontological values
as deriving from the objective badness of the harm prohibited by the moral duty.  In Nagel’s view, what is wrong
with violating deontological constraints is that the agent makes evil part of her intention.  NAGEL, supra note ___, at
180.  But there is a prior question which must be addressed, namely whether evil will occur.  In a trolley-type case
where one person is intentionally killed to save the lives of five, it can plausibly argued that what occurred was not
evil if a person could reasonably consent to the victim’s treatment.  See Korsgaard, supra note ___, at 297.  
  Bernard Williams, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 12 (1981) (defining ground16
projects, as those commitments “which are closely related to [the agent’s] existence and which to a significant degree
give meaning to his life”).
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agent’s own ideals.  Agent-relative reasons are not subjective or idiosyncratic, because any
similarly-situated agent would recognize them, but they often arise only by virtue of someone
having established relationships or made commitments that are not mandatory from a moral point
of view.   Relying on agent-relative values to inform action within professional roles thus seems14
to be a promising strategy for reducing the sense of alienation created by the gap between the
agent’s own commitments and the ethical demands of the role.  
II. Integrity in Legal Ethics.
In this paper I am concerned with a particular kind of agent-relative values — namely,
those related to a person’s integrity, in the sense of maintaining fidelity over time to one’s own
commitments and loyalties.   Borrowing a term from Bernard Williams, we can talk in terms of15
the ethical significance of a person’s ground projects.   Williams argues that without having16
certain sufficiently important desires, commitments, and interests, it would be unclear why one
  Id. at 8 (citing Derek Parfit’s discussion of the metaphysics of personal identity in Reasons and Persons). 17
See also Fried, supra note ___, at 1069 (“any concern for others which is a human concern must presuppose a
concern for ourselves”).   
  NAGEL, supra note ___, at 170.  18
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should bother going on living at all.  This is not a contingent matter of the psychology of any
particular agent; rather, it is a conceptual truth about persons.  In his view, one’s ongoing desires
and commitments are a necessary condition of personhood, as a metaphysical matter.   The unity17
of identity over time that is necessary to constitute a person requires that a would-be person be
able to hold fast to his or her commitments.  A so-called “later self” is related to my present self
only insofar as those two selves are connected via relationships of commitment and interests to
various things.  Identification of the ground projects of an agent is logically prior to the
conclusion that two selves, separated in time, are the same person.  But the agent-neutral demand
that all of one’s actions be impartially justified severs the connection between the agent and her
projects, for it is conceivable that morality may issue in an obligation that requires one to give up
a project, at least for a time.  But giving up a project even “for a time” threatens the unity of
character that is a condition for the possibility of continuous selfhood over time.  For these
reasons, ethics must make room for people to pursue their projects, by granting moral permission
to do something in furtherance of one’s ground projects that would otherwise be wrong.  If
someone would otherwise be obligated (for utilitarian reasons) to contribute time, energy, and
money to a cause such as relieving hunger, a ground project such as training for a marathon or
learning to play all the Beethoven piano sonatas would create an excuse from what would
otherwise be this moral obligation, even though there is no agent-neutral value in these projects
that would make them morally obligatory for everyone.   18
  Recall that the third possibility for justification is that an action is not wrong in ordinary moral terms. 19
For example, in the cross-examination case, the lawyer might argue that she does not know what the truth of the
matter is.  As the defense lawyer in A Civil Action memorably observed, “the truth is at the bottom of a bottomless
pit.”  See JONATHAN HARR, A  CIVIL ACTION  340 (1995) (quoting Jerome Facher).  In a great many contexts,
however, lawyers believe themselves capable of ascertaining the truth.  For example, when advising a client on
whether or not to settle (or plead guilty), lawyers drop the pose of Cartesian doubt and counsel clients based on a 
common-sense epistemology which includes principles for judging the weight of evidence and the credibility of
witnesses.  In general, when faced with charges of moral wrongdoing, lawyers’ attempts at rebuttal in ordinary moral
terms tend not to be successful.  The more promising strategies of justification in legal ethics are the first two,
appealing to either the exclusionary character or weight of institutional values.  For that reason, I will concentrate on
those patterns of justification in this paper.  
  Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 NYU  L. REV. 63 (1980).20
8
Orienting legal ethics, to a greater or lesser extent, around the ground projects of
individual lawyers may help reduce the tension between ordinary and institutional values.  It has
often been observed that relying on an agent-neutral justification for prioritizing institutional
obligations over ordinary moral duties runs the risk of creating profound alienation in
practitioners.  Suppose the institutional values associated with the legal system operate either to
create exclusionary reasons for action or outweigh ordinary moral values in the practical
reasoning of a lawyer.   The lawyer operating in this institutional context may correctly believe19
herself to be justified in doing things that would otherwise be morally wrong, but these
institutional values may not be part of the ethical values and commitments that animate her day-
to-day life outside the institutional context.  As Gerald Postema has observed, the lawyer may
find herself in the position of needing to connect with or detach from a set of values as she enters
and leaves a professional role — metaphorically, when putting on or taking off her professional
hat.   Unlike a hat, however, moral stances cannot be easily assumed or shed, at least if a person20
is acting in good faith.  What is needed to ease the transition back and forth between ordinary and
professional worlds is some kind of unifying deliberative framework that transcends the ordinary
and institutional contexts.  Unfortunately, this unifying framework might be a stance of
  Id. at 78.21
  Id. at 82.  22
  Id. (“Each lawyer must have a conception of the role that allows him to serve the important functions of23
that role in the legal and political system while integrating his own sense of moral responsibility into the role itself.”).
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detachment from the moral convictions she had considered important in her pre-professional
moral life.   The lawyer might avoid endorsing this attitude, believing it to be just an elaborate21
sham or performance, but this stance of detachment risks turning into more pervasive cynicism or
skepticism about morality generally.  
Although Postema does not use this terminology, the problem he identifies is an instance
of the conflict between agent-neutral and agent-relative values.  The solution he recommends is
to imagine some way for lawyers to bridge the “discontinuities in the moral landscape” with a
“unified conception of moral personality.”   In other words, he seeks to restore personal integrity22
to its rightful place in professional ethics.  He argues, in effect, that lawyers should make
institutional values part of their own set of desires and commitments, that is, to turn to ground
projects and their associated agent-relative values for justification.  Ordinary moral values and
institutional values are not in tension if a person adopts ideals and attachments that are
coextensive with the social goods and values served by the role.   For example, if the legal23
system and legal profession in a society are designed to protect individual rights, and a person
believes strongly in working for the protection of individual rights, then working as a lawyer
creates no conflicts between personal attachments and professional obligations.  A lawyer can
therefore take advantage of a justification for her actions, and avoid the alienation that is created
by oscillating back and forth between ordinary and institutional evaluative standpoints, by
  Id. at 77.  24
  See Markovits, supra note ___. 25
  See id. at 242. 26
  Id. at 224.  27
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incorporating institutional values into her own set of ordinary ethical ground projects.  A lawyer
employing this strategy of incorporation would not face the problem that institutional values may
require the lawyer to “engage in activities, make arguments, and present positions which he
himself does not endorse or embrace.”   This “incorporationist” solution, elaborated with24
reference to Christine Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivist moral theory, is the subject of Section
III of this paper.  
Section IV will discuss a very different, and much stronger view of the role of integrity in
legal ethics, advanced by Daniel Markovits.  In a rich and complex paper, which has been
expanded into a forthcoming book, he argues that the standard debate legal ethics has gotten
everything backwards, by trying to evaluate the conduct of lawyers in terms of agent-neutral
values.   Markovits objects to the “hegemonic claim of third-personal morality.”   The third-25 26
personal or agent-neutral perspective is deficient because it fails to consider the “authorship” of
actions — that is, the intimacy of the connection between a person (with her characteristic aims
and projects) and what she does in the world.   Instead of worrying only about impartial value,27
lawyers should be primarily concerned for their own integrity, and only secondarily oriented
toward the agent-neutral reasons that are usually given by way of justification.  This is a strong
version of the familiar position that people may be justified in reserving special concern for
  Scheffler, supra note ___, at 252.28
  Fried, supra note ___, at 1071.  Although this point is neither here nor there with respect to the issue of29
integrity taken up in this paper, it is worth noting that Fried’s argument ultimately does not depend on agent-relative
values.  Rather than taking the position that friendship is non-instrumentally valuable, Fried argues that the legay
system is so complex that it is necessary to create an institutional actor, analogous to a “special-purpose friend,” who
is capable of assisting citizens with their interactions with the law.  Id. at 1073.  Thus, the impartial value of the
autonomy of all citizens lies behind the recognition of special moral privileges for “legal friends.”  Fried’s statement
that “[t]he lawyer acts morally because he helps to preserve and express the autonomy of his client vis-a-vis the legal
system” id. at 1074, is an appeal to the agent-neutral value of autonomy, not the relationship the lawyer has
established with the client.
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 240, 244.  30
  Id. at 229-34.  31
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friends, family members, and others with whom they are in intimate relationships.  Some agent-
relative values take precedence over impartial ethical concerns because “we should attend to the
interests of our associates, even if doing so means that the comparable interests of other equally
worthy people will go unsatisfied.”   Charles Fried famously attempted to analogize the lawyer-28
client relationship to close personal relationships, in which people are permitted to hold
something of themselves in reserve from the universalizing demands of impartial morality.  29
Markovits goes much farther than Fried, however, by insisting that an agent’s connection to a
course of action can matter more than the rights of other affected persons or the state of affairs
thereby brought into existence.   This argument is partially axiological, and is based on a non-30
teleological theory of value in which value inheres not in states of affairs in the world or in
relations among persons.   Even accepting for the moment the constructivists’ suggestion that31
value is a property of the rational will, Markovits’ position is still quite radical in its resistance to
evaluating the ground projects of agents with reference to impartial values.  
In Section V, I will discuss my claim that personal integrity should be at best of
  See BERNARD W ILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING W AS THE DEED:  REALISM  AND MORALISM  IN POLITICAL32
ARGUMENT 5 (2005) (the demand for legitimacy “does not represent a morality which is prior to politics.  It is a
claim that is inherent in there being such a thing as politics”).  
12
secondary importance in legal ethics.  First, reasoning on the basis of personal values is out of
place in an institutional context that is not ultimately grounded on personal values.  Law belongs
to the domain of politics, this much is obvious, but it seems to have been taken largely for
granted by theorists of the lawyering role that the political (that is to say institutional) values that
inform a lawyer’s professional activities are reducible to pre-political moral values.  If, on the
other hand, there is a distinctive political morality that arises in virtue of something’s being
described as “politics,”  then the sorts of ordinary moral concerns that would ordinarily serve as32
the basis for organizing one’s interests and ideals into a coherent life project would be out of
place when one is thinking about one’s professional life.  Institutional morality need not be
wholly independent of ordinary morality — and, it probably should not be — but if there are
good moral reasons for recognizing an institutional practice with its own internal regulative
standards, then the practice may create a kind of filter or preclusion of ordinary morality in the
institutional or professional domain.  The implication of this value pluralism is that a complex
system of professional ethics, which is attentive to the demands of both agent-neutral and agent-
relative values, should not attempt to reconcile impartial morality and personal integrity using
some kind of priority procedure, or by reducing one set of values to the other.  Instead, these two
sources of value should be recognized as independent and autonomous.  The further implication
of the existence of autonomous domains of value is the possibility of dirty hands — i.e., that an
action may be evaluated as wrong with reference to the values in one domain and permissible, or
even mandatory, with reference to the values in the other. 
  See David Luban, Integrity:  Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003).  33
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The second line of objection to integrity in professional ethics is directed primarily
against the strong claims of Markovits, that an agent’s actions in conformity with her character,
practical identity, or ground projects are immune to criticism based on impartial values. 
Impartial considerations must enter the analysis somewhere — either at the micro, case-by-case
evaluative level, or at the level of adjudicating potential ground projects as either ethically
admissible or inadmissible.  The ground project of “pacifist” is admissible as a suitable focal
point for organizing one’s ethical commitments and actions, and one who is committed to this
project may be excused for refusing to comply with what would otherwise be an ethically
justifiable demand that one engage in military service.  On the other hand, the ground project of
“wiseguy” is not admissible, and one could not claim an exemption from an otherwise applicable
ethical obligation, such as not to use violence to settle trivial disputes, on the basis of being
committed to that ground project.  The examples here are caricatures, as is Bernard Williams’
hypothetical (appropriated by Markovits) of Jim and the Indians.  The discussion can be made
more realistic by considering the psychological mechanism by which a person might acquire new
and pernicious ground projects through a process of cognitive dissonance reduction.  David
Luban’s nicely paradoxical work on integrity develops a critique similar to what I am raising here
— namely, that remaining true to one’s commitments has ethical value only where those
commitments have not been adversely influenced by the need to adapt to one’s environment.   In33
order for considerations of integrity to justify or excuse what would otherwise be a moral
violation, a person’s ground projects must be morally worthy objects of concern.  A person may
  The notion of “eligible” projects is taken from Raz’s work on value, and is developed helpfully by34
Scanlon in a paper on what it means for something to be a reason.  See T.M. Scanlon, Reasons:  A Puzzling Duality,
in WALLACE, supra note ___, at 231, 236
  See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?, 15 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD . 1, 3-435
(1995).  
  So far as I know this term was first used in Ernest Gellner, Analysis and Ontology, 1 PHIL. Q. 48536
(1951).
  For this way of putting G.E. Moore’s open question argument, see Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard &37
Peter Railton, Toward fin de siecle Ethics:  Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115, 117 (1992).
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decide to commit to one among a wide range of morally eligible potential ground projects,  but34
the eligibility analysis is logically prior to the evaluation that one is justified in acting in
furtherance of one’s ground projects.  Thus, integrity is of secondary importance in comparison
with the impartial values that constrain the adoption of ground projects.  
III. Korsgaard and the Incorporationist Solution.
To understand the attraction of relying on agent-relative values in ethics, it may be helpful
to take a brief metaethical detour.  It is generally assumed, as Hume insisted, that it is in the
nature of ethics that it must make a practical difference, by guiding action.   One of the central35
questions of ethical theory is therefore how anything in the natural world — anything we might
call a “fact” or part of the “furniture of the universe”  — might give us a reason to act in a36
certain way.  For any naturalistic property, we might imagine “clear-headed beings who would
fail to find appropriate reason or motive to action in the mere fact that” the property obtains.  37
John Mackie’s famous “argument from queerness” noted that if ethical values — which are
intrinsically action-guiding and motivating — are somehow part of the fabric of the universe,
  J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS:  INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 38-42 (1977). 38
  STEPHEN L. DARWALL, IM PARTIAL REASON  55 (1983). 39
  MACKIE, supra note ___, at 48-49.  40
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they would have to be very strange things indeed, which would be difficult to account for on a
standard empiricist account of how we come to know something about the natural world.   The38
epistemological difficulties in coming to know about nonnatural properties are compounded by
the need to rely on some kind of faculty of intuition capable of discerning these properties, which
has an ambiguous relationship to other faculties such as sensory perception.  As Stephen Darwall
notes:
If something’s being a right-making consideration is not a complicated sort of
motivational property, a disposition to be impressed in certain ways by that
consideration in certain circumstances, then what sort of property is it?  The only
alternative view seems to be a doctrine that requires both metaphysical and
epistemological mystery:  nonnatural properties and a special sort of intuition or
insight to discern them.   39
Even if one can address the ontological and epistemological problems associated with realism, it
is still a challenge to explain how the accurate perception of facts about the world necessarily
motivates one who perceives them.  Thus, it is a massive, pervasive conceptual error to talk as
though there is a fact of the matter concerning ethical truth, at least if truth is understood as
involving a correspondence relationship with values in the natural world.   40
Problems such as these have persuaded many that it is impossible to be a realist about the
foundations of ethics.  Alternatives to realist ethical theories relate meaning (and claims about
the truth of propositions of ethics) to the natural world in a metaphysically straightforward way,
  It should be noted that there are ways to be a moral realist without relying on inflationary metaphysics,41
for example by denying that we have non-ethical terms for all natural properties; it may be possible to maintain a
form of moral realism in which ethical properties supervene on the basic nature of things in a way that is analogous
2to property identification statements in natural science, such as “water is H O.”  See, e.g., Nicholas L. Sturgeon,
Ethical Naturalism , in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY  91, 97-100 (David Copp. 2006).  This non-
reductive naturalism would deny that ethical properties are “projected” onto the physical world by humans, but it
would nevertheless concede a shared causal-explanatory role for the natural world and human minds in constructing
ethical judgments.  
  HILARY PUTNAM , Objectivity and the Science/Ethics Distinction, in REALISM WITH A HUMAN FACE  16342
(James Conant ed. 1990).
  Id. at 176-77.  43
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but have a hard time answer accounting for the objectivity of ethical judgment.  By essentially
admitting that there is a gap between “is” statements about the natural world and normative
“ought” statements about ethics, theorists who reject the inflationary metaphysics of moral
realism seem to give up the possibility of grounding objectivity using anything like the methods
of the empirical sciences.   As Hilary Putnam and others have emphasized, however, there is no41
reason to think that objectivity in ethics will be secured using the same kinds of procedures that
are used in the sciences.   We know the moon is not made of cheese because we have brought42
back moon rocks and subjected them to physical and chemical analysis.  Because we cannot
verify ethical propositions by performing similar tests, it is tempting to conclude that we do not
know the truth of something we believe to be true, e.g. that slavery is evil.  As Putnam puts it,
beyond being able to offer the sorts of arguments that one would ordinarily offer in support of the
proposition that slavery is evil, there is no sense in which we can explain how this knowledge is
possible in an absolute sense, and it is certainly not helpful to look to science for an explanation
of how we know this.   As a matter of practical ethical reasoning, it is surely right that we have43
to do the best we can, and not worry too much about the ultimate foundations for these
arguments.  But the rejection of inflationary metaphysics need not push ethics too far in the
  Darwall, et al., supra note ___, at 131-38.44
  See CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORM ATIVITY  (Onora O’Neill ed. 1993).  45
  Id. at 36.  46
  Id. at 40 (citing DAVID O. BRINK., MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATION OF ETHICS (1989); Peter47
Railton, Moral Realism , 95 PHIL. REV. 163 (1986)).  
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direction of an anti-theoretical stance.  Even if we do not rely on truth-making properties in the
natural world to underwrite the objectivity of ethical judgments, it may still be possible to
establish an objective foundation for ethics in some aspect of the practical reasoning of agents.  44
Theories that begin with the structure of practical reasoning concede the discontinuity between
ethics and science, but in doing so embrace the distinctiveness of ethical reasoning as a source of
its authority.
Christine Korsgaard’s moral constructivism is an attempt to establish an objective
foundations for moral decisionmaking, but on a very different pattern from the claims to
objectivity made by the sciences.   As an ethical constructivist, Korsgaard wishes to deny that45
there are moral facts or truths out there in the world somehow, which exist independently of
procedures for discovering them.   This goes not only for the kind of moral facts as bizarre non-46
natural entities mocked by Mackie, but also for more modest contemporary versions of realism
that attempt to locate moral value in natural facts such as pleasure and pain, desire and
aversion.   The trouble with any substantive version of moral realism is that it gives an47
implausible answer to the problem of normativity.  If someone asks, “Why should I do such-and-
such?”, a moral realist is bound to give an answer that refers to normative properties in the
world, which it is possible to grasp, be motivated by, and have reasons to act on.  But it is hard to
  Christine M. Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,  J. PHIL.48
RES. 99, 115 (Supplement 2003) [hereinafter, “Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism”].  
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 44-47.  49
  See G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 17-19 (1903).  For the continuing centrality of Moore’s open50
question argument to ethical theory, see Darwall, et al., supra note ___, at 116-19.
  Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism, supra note ___, at 110-12.  51
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 47.  52
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see how any such properties can be action-guiding, as morality is supposed to be.  Morality is a
branch of practical, not theoretical reasoning.   It is concerned with what people have reason to48
believe, but only to the extent that this bears on the ultimate question of what people have reason
to do.   (In any event, having knowledge about some property of the world leaves an open49
question — as Moore would put it  — about why one ought to care about the property that has50
been discovered and act on it.  Even if some action is known to be “good,” what reason do we
have for performing good actions?  The normativity question concerns the transition from
accurate perception of facts to reasons for action, so there is always an open question concerning
the nature of the norm that prescribes action on the basis of perception of facts. )  As a result,51
argues Korsgaard, the central question for ethics is not how we have knowledge of ethical
objects, or any sort of knowledge at all; rather, it is whether our reasons for action withstand the
test of reflection.   And this turns out to be a matter of personal integrity, as we will see.  52
Korsgaard’s ingenious answer to the problem of normativity is that the solution is
implicit in an adequate description of the practical problem facing agents who must decide how
  For a helpful overview of Korsgaard’s position, see William J. FitzPatrick, The Practical Turn in Ethical53
Theory:  Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity, 115 ETHICS 651 (2005).
  Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism, supra note ___, at 115.54
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 93.  55
  Id. at 97; see also Christine M. Korsgaard, Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self:  A Reply56
to Ginsborg, Guyer, and Schneewind, 109 ETHICS 49, 50 (1998) [hereinafter “Korsgaard, Value of the Self”]
(“Incentives operate on conscious beings causally, as a kind of attraction, but they do not by themselves cause
actions.  Incentives work in conjunction with what I will call principles, which determine the conscious being’s
responses to those incentives.”). 
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to act.   Ethics is not about discovering truths, but about using reason to solve practical53
problems.   It is inherent in our nature as rational beings that we act on the basis of reasons. 54
That is, we want to know why we should do something.  For Korsgaard, the notion of a reason is
bound up with reflection, which subjects inclinations and desires to the scrutiny of detached
assessment. We may have desires, incentives, and interests, but they are not yet reasons for
action. “The normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success.”   Our inclinations,55
desires, and so only become reasons after they pass muster, so to speak, when we endorse them
after a process of critical scrutiny.  “Reflective success” must mean endorsement from the point56
of view of something; otherwise reflection would be an empty process.  But from what
standpoint is one to make that determination?  This is where agent-relativity and personal
integrity enters the picture for Korsgaard, as an alternative to the Kantian approach of seeking to
ground the objectivity of ethics in the structure of the rational will.  
A rigorous Kantian might focus on the choice-worthiness of an alternative, qua free and
responsible being.  A free will is self-determining; that is, it is not determined by any
  See IM M ANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS *410 (James W. Ellington trans.57
1981) (1785) (“the principles of morality are . . . to be found . . . completely a priori and free from everything
empirical in pure rational concepts only”).
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 97-98.  58
  Korsgaard, Value of the Self, supra note ___, at 62.59
  KANT, supra note ___, at *421.60
  Korsgaard, Realism and Constructivism, supra note ___, at 114.61
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 220-2162
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“heteronomous” cause, including the desires and inclinations of the agent.   Although the free57
will must be determined by its own law, the will cannot be conceived as choosing for no reason.  58
It is inherent in the concept of agency that an agent needs reasons to act.   Otherwise an action is59
not willed — one is merely being blown about on the winds of desire, as opposed to acting freely
and rationally.  For Kant, the self-legislation of the will is therefore subject to the test of
universalizability — whether it is possible for a rational being to will a maxim of action as a
universal law.   This test guarantees that a free will chooses lawfully:  60
The problem faced by the free will is this:  the free will must have a law, but
because the will is free, it must be its own law.  And nothing determines what that
law must be.  All that it has to be is a law.61
As a matter of the logical form of an unconditioned will, Kant’s approach is certainly coherent.  
But Korsgaard and many others have questioned whether the test of universalizability, by itself,
gives sufficient content to a system of morality that actual human beings can live by.   62
Conceiving of oneself as a member of the party of humanity, or a citizen of the Kingdom of
Ends, may not be the kind of self-conception that can provide anything like a meaningful focal
  See also Barbara Herman, Integrity and Impartiality, in THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGM ENT 23 (1993).63
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 101.  64
  See T IM DARE, COUNSEL OF ROGUES? ___ (2007).65
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 101.  66
  Thick descriptions bridge the factual and evaluative domains, because a proper grasp of the factual67
description of an event commits one to an evaluation.  Foot’s example of “rudeness” is intended to show that a
competent user of the language, who knew when it was appropriate to ascribe the label “rude” to behavior, grasps the
meaning of “rude,” including its evaluative aspects.  See Philippa Foot, Moral Arguments, in VIRTUES AND V ICES 96
(1978).  One who did not describe an action from an ethical point of view would literally be unable to use a term like
“rude” correctly. 
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point for living a recognizably human life.   In this way, Korsgaard’s neo-Kantianism shares63
common ground with Bernard Williams’ emphasis on stable ground projects as a condition of
agency.  The difference is that, for Korsgaard, the source of value around which we organize our
reflection is not an external object of commitment, but a way of conceiving of, and valuing,
oneself.  This is Korgaard’s notion of practical identity —  “a description under which you value
yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be
worth undertaking.”   64
Practical identity may express itself in familiar role terms — i.e. a person is a parent,
someone’s friend, a member of a religious or national community, and so on.  In these cases,
certain role-specific obligations are build right in to the description of the role.   Korsgaard’s65
example is being a psychologist, and considering whether to violate the confidences of her
patients — the normative “ought not” is part of the proper description of the role.   (The job66
description of a psychologist is thus a “thick” description. )  Natural roles, such as the role of67
parent, similarly build to-be-doneness into their descriptions.  One cares for one’s children
  See also Philippa Foot, Goodness and Choice, in FOOT, supra note ___, at 132, 137-38 (objects named68
in terms of their function, such as parents, incorporate evaluation into the ability to identify the object by that name).
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 102.  69
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because that is what it means to be a parent; there is no way to coherently describe the role of
parent without including an obligation to care for one’s children.   Significantly, and in response68
to one of the reasons suggested above for the resistance to agent-neutrality in ethics, practical
identity serves both as a source of normativity and of moral motivation.  One does not violate the
obligations associated with one’s practical identity because “to violate them is to lose your
integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be what you are.  That is, it is to no longer be able
to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself.”   The role of integrity69
is therefore both to provide a standard for appraising the choice-worthiness of alternatives and to
serve as a motivation to act on moral duties.  In ordinary moral life we express this connection
between obligation and motivation using expressions like, “I couldn’t live with myself if I did
that.”  In the context of professional roles, the practical cost of not complying with an obligation
associated with that role would be giving up one of the ends for which the role is constituted,
which was the reason for deciding to enter the role in the first place — this would be a kind of
practical incoherence.  Notice that this has the effect of closing up the gap between the sources of
value that underlie a professional role and the agent’s own commitments and values.  Thus, the
problem of alienation observed by critics of professional role-differentiated morality does not
arise for someone whose practical identity is oriented toward the demands of the role.  
I have referred to Korsgaard’s emphasis on practical identity as the “incorporationist”
  Ogletree, supra note ___, at 1271.  Markovits proposes a different kind of practical identity for would-be70
lawyers — not commitment to a value that is congnizable in ordinary life, such as fighting injustice or standing up
for marginalized groups, but a value that is peculiar to the professional role.  His proposal is that lawyers commit
themselves to the ideal of fidelity.  See Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of Adjudication, 75
FORDHAM  L. REV. 1367, 1391 (2006).  The most important aspect of fidelity is self-effacement, i.e. striving to
maintain no voice (and, presumably, moral commitments) of one’s own while speaking on behalf of others.  See
Markovits, supra note ___, at 273.  I will have more to say below about the ideal of self-effacement, but for now I
will simply point out that unlike Ogletree’s proposal of orienting the ethics of public defenders around values that
have a great deal of appeal to many people in pre-professional life, Markovits’ reliance on integrity depends on
would-be lawyers making a highly idiosyncratic professional value into a central aspect of their ethical projects.  It is
easy to understand the psychological attraction of the project of struggling against unjust hierarchies, and therefore
the reasons why this might become someone’s central organizing ground project.  It seems less plausible that there
are many people who, apart from professional roles, are moved by the idea of emptying themselves, maintaining
“unusually selfless empathy,” and understanding themselves as “mouthpiece[s].”  Id.  
23
solution to the problem addressed in this paper, namely whether a person can act within a
professional role while remaining true to her own moral commitments and projects.  The relevant 
incorporation occurs when the agent adopts the institutional values that are immanent in a
professional role as part of her own ground projects.  The incorporation need not be an explicit,
voluntary act; more commonly, a person may have pre-existing commitments that happen to line
up with institutional values.  For example, a person may tend to feel empathy for disenfranchised
people, and wish to support them in their struggles against injustice.  If these commitments were
sufficiently central, they might constitute a ground project (in Williams’ sense) or the person’s
practical identity (in Korsgaard’s sense), serving as a touchstone against which the choice-
worthiness of an action is measured.  As it happens, empathy, the desire to stand up on behalf of
the oppressed, and perhaps even a sense of commitment to a class struggle are motivations that
connect certain kinds of lawyers, such as public defenders, to the institutional values that
underpin their role.   These commitments may have been formed prior to the person choosing70
the professional role of lawyer, may relate to the person’s upbringing and environment, and may
be only contingently related to the person’s career trajectory, in the sense that they may not have
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 217-18 (listing vices committed by lawyers, such as “papering cases, filing71
implausible claims and counterclaims, and delaying or extending discovery,” “badger[ing] and callously attack[ing]
truthful but vulnerable opposition witnesses,” and “present[ing] colorable versions of the facts that they themselves
do not believe”).  
  For his explanation for this choice of terminology, in preference to the distinction between agent-neutral72
and agent-relative, see id. at 223 n.31.  
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been the principal motivation for going to law school and taking a particular job.  Nevertheless,
the overlap between reasons of personal integrity — the agent-relative considerations that are
central to the work of Williams and Korsgaard — and the obligations of the professional role
eliminates the tension created by the conflict between ordinary and institutional values.  The two
kinds of values come together in a unified professional/personal conception of agency, which
greatly simplifies the moral life of a person acting within a professional role.  But this may be
nothing more than a happy coincidence; nothing in Korsgaard’s argument obligates anyone to
incorporate role-specific values into her practical identity.  The possibility therefore remains of a
lawyer whose practical identity is in tension with her role obligations.  
IV. Markovits:  The (Absolute) Priority of Integrity.
Daniel Markovits argues that the possibility of one’s practical identity conflicting with
role obligations is not a marginal case, but is a pervasive feature of the ethical landscape for
contemporary lawyers.  Lawyers’ role-specific obligations require them to engage in what can
only be described in ordinary moral terms as lying and cheating.   These prima facie moral71
wrongs can be justified or excused on the basis of certain agent-neutral reasons (which Markovits
refers to as third-personal, or impartial reasons),  but it is unlikely that any of these reasons can72
  Id. at 220.  73
  For the phenomenological argument for the existence of “moral remainders,” see CHRISTOPHER W.74
GOWANS, INNOCENCE LOST:  AN EXAM INATION OF INESCAPABLE MORAL WRONGDOING 57, 88, 103, 117-18, and
passim  (1994).  
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 224.75
  Id. at 226.  76
  Id. at 240.  77
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make up the kind of ground project that any person would want to adopt.  Even if actions within
a role are justified from an agent-neutral point of view, lawyers “will still need to construct a
first-personal account of these practices that casts them as part of a life they can endorse,
generating a self-understanding they can live with.”   Markovits’ point is not just a73
phenomenological one, that agents may experience sentiments of guilt, shame, regret, and so on,
as a result of having transgressed some moral value despite having acted rightly on an all-things-
considered basis.   Instead, Markovits wants to argue that the act is wrong, and it is wrong74
because of the agent’s relationship of authorship with the resulting harm.   Impartial reasoning,75
on the basis of agent-neutral values, fails to take seriously the intimacy of the connection
between the actor and the wrongdoing.   Agent-relative reasons are permitted to trump agent-76
neutral values; as Markovits argues, “the degree of intimacy of [the agent’s] connection to a
course of action may properly matter more to [the agent] than to third parties” who may be
adversely affected if the agent refuses to engage in what the agent believes to be wrongdoing.   77
This sounds at first like an argument about nothing.  One might object that if something is
wrongdoing, then it is wrongdoing across the board, from an agent-neutral or an agent-relative
point of view.  In professional ethics, however, Markovits argues that there may be cases in
  Id. at 261 (“The charge that lawyers lie, cheat, and abuse do not evaporate simply because the adversary78
system within which lawyers commit these vices is impartially justified.”).
  Id. at 225-26; Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism , in J.J.C. SM ART &  BERNARD W ILLIAMS,79
UTILITARIANISM :  FOR AND AGAINST 77, 98 (1973).  Nagel has a similar example in The View from Nowhere, in
which a traveler whose friends were injured in a car crash may obtain the keys to an unused car, and thus transport
his friends to the hospital, only by twisting the arm of a small child in order to compel his grandmother to give up the
keys.  See NAGEL, supra note ___, at 176.
  See Korsgaard, supra note ___, at 292.  80
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which the justified demands of the professional role require the agent to do something that would
be wrong in ordinary moral terms, where the wrongness is a function of the agent’s integrity, not
the agent-neutral values that go into the justification of the professional role.   He develops this78
argument using the well known “Jim and the Indians” thought experiment proposed by Bernard
Williams in his critique of utilitarianism.   Modifying the example slightly, suppose Jim is a79
famous American journalist who visits a South American country governed by a military
dictatorship. In his travels,  Jim happens upon a band of government troops holding twenty
indigenous revolutionary fighters as captives.  To make some sort of political point (this is
obscure in Williams’ example), the captain of the counterinsurgency force offers Jim a deal — if
Jim himself shoots one of the prisoners, the troops will free the rest; if Jim refuses, the soldiers
will immediately execute all the prisoners.  This hypothetical is obviously fanciful, but the
structure of Jim’s dilemma is intended to sharpen and throw into relief the competing ethical
positions.  On a strict utilitarian analysis, not only must Jim shoot one prisoner, but this is an
easy question.  Critics are correct to point out that the confident assertion that this is an easy
question is surely a deficiency in utilitarianism, since our pretheoretic moral intuition is that there
is a wrenching dilemma for Jim, presented by the commander’s offer.   On the other hand, a80
strict deontologist who refused to violate the rights of the one prisoner in order to save the others
  Id. at 296.  81
  See APPLBAUM , supra note ___, at 155-62.  This is the point of Korsgaard’s metaphor of the smaller82
moral world, in which Jim and the prisoners are forced to regard the soldiers as forces of nature which limit their
choices from what would have been available in an ideal world.  See KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 296.  As I will
discuss in the following section, professional ethics is the ethical system of a nonideal or smaller moral world, and
therefore professionals may be involved in acts of justified wrongdoing.  
  NAGEL, supra note ___, at 176.  This is Markovits’ point about authorship of wrongdoing.  Even if there83
are agent-neutral reasons to kill one of the prisoners, Jim has a reason not to, because of the concern about being
intimately connected with the killing.  Markovits, supra note ___, at 226-27.  
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(because the morality of actions is assessed in accordance with the agent’s will, not outcomes)
also seems to miss the dilemmatic character of Jim’s situation.  It seems almost sanctimonious
for Jim to insist on adhering to Kantian principles when shooting one prisoner would be the
Pareto optimal result, in terms of violations of the rights of the prisoners.  It is not difficult to
imagine Jim being moved by the sacrifice of the oldest prisoner stepping forward and saying,
“Please go ahead, shoot me, and I forgive you in advance.”   But even in the absence of such81
express consent, Jim might infer reasonable ex ante consent to employing a fair procedure to
randomly select one prisoner to shoot — that one prisoner would be no worse off (since the
soldiers were going to shoot him anyway), and the others are better off.  Thus, any prisoner in
that situation would consent in advance to the lottery procedure.   82
It is difficult to account for any sense of dilemma in this problem if ethical values are
given only in impartial or agent-neutral terms.  In terms of consequences, the death of twenty
prisoners is obviously worse than the death of one; similarly, in terms of rights, the violation of
the rights of twenty prisoners is worse than the violation of the rights of one.  The dilemma arises
only if we consider the relationship of the agent to the outcome.   Jim must incorporate evil into83
the description of his action — Jim’s intent must be to shoot to kill, because otherwise he will
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 238-39. 84
  Id. at 261, 270.85
  Id. at 262.  86
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not succeed at his chosen end.  The result of having collaborated with the captain is that Jim will
have betrayed the ideals and ambitions that are constitutive of who he is as a person.   Moving84
from the fanciful example of Jim to the situation of lawyers acting within a professional role,
Markovits argues by analogy that although certain actions may be impartially justified (just as
shooting one of the prisoners is justified), they are incompatible with the ground projects of a
person who has ethical ambitions “to be honest, to play fair, and to treat others kindly.”   Even85
if, let us suppose, vigorously cross-examining a truthful witness is justified because it contributes
to a process that is generally effective at finding out the truth, it still requires the lawyer to take
part personally in lying, cheating, and possibly humiliating another person.  For the lawyer to fall
back on the institutional values which justify the cross-examination is for the lawyer to, in effect,
see herself as merely “a cog in a causal machine,”  rather than an autonomous moral agent with86
her own commitments and values.  
I am sympathetic with the point made by Nagel, Markovits, and others, that abstracting
away from the point of view of agents misses a distinctive kind of moral cost that falls on people
who commit agent-neutrally justified harms to others.  Nevertheless we should resist the
conclusion that shooting one prisoner is therefore prohibited.  As Nagel asks rhetorically: 
The immediacy of the fact that you must try to produce evil as a subsidiary aim is
phenomenologically important, but why should it be morally important?  Even
  NAGEL, supra note ___, at 183.  87
  Id. at 184.  88
  Korsgaard, supra note ___, at 298.  89
  See SCANLON , supra note ___, at 189.  Furthermore, even if we accept Nagel’s contention that shooting90
one innocent prisoner or twisting the child’s arm is wrong in agent-relative terms because the agent incorporates evil
into the description of her intent, we still need a way to define “evil” and distinguish it from other instances in which
we hurt people but do not act wrongfully.  A doctor may cause permanent harm in the course of providing reasonably
skilled medical treatment, but does not thereby become a wrongdoer.  Scanlon’s suggestion is that we can flesh out
the notion of wrongdoing with reference to what suitably motivated persons could not reasonably reject.  Whether
one agrees with this precise method of moral justification, I believe something like this process of reasoning must go
on in the background before it is possible to describe any action as incorporating any evaluation into its description.
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though it adds to the personal cost to you, why should it result in a prohibition?87
The problem with Markovits’ exclusively agent-relative picture of values, in which Jim seeks to
avoid entanglement with evil, is that it would eliminate the perspective of the victims, who
would probably (and quite reasonably) prefer to take a one-in-twenty chance of death over a one
hundred percent chance of death.  If Jim insisted on his own moral purity, the nineteen un-saved
innocent victims would seemingly have no right to object if Jim did not take the opportunity to
kill one prisoner to save the rest.”   As Korsgaard observes, if all of the moral reasons at play in88
this example were agent-relative, it would be none of the business of any of the prisoners what
Jim decided to do.   This cannot be right, because morality is surely (at least in part) concerned89
with the perspective of potential victims of wrongdoing — with what may reasonably be justified
to others.   Markovits criticizes impartial moralities for ignoring the perspective of Jim, but an90
exclusively agent-relative morality errs too far in the other direction by ignoring the perspective
of the prisoners.  Jim’s agency is one thing that matters in the circumstances of the problem (and
it certainly matters with particular salience to Jim) but the avoidable harm to nineteen innocent
people is surely also a feature of the situation.  In order to account for this complexity, it is
  NAGEL, supra note ___, at 184.  91
  See Peter Railton, Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality, in CONSEQUENTIALISM92
AND ITS CRITICS 93, 94-96 (Samuel Scheffler ed. 1988) (using examples in which people give reasons in impersonal,
detached, objective language to make the point that it can be difficult to represent important connections and
attachments in agent-neutral terms).
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 243.93
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necessary to take account of the perspectives both of Jim and of the foreseeable victims of
wrongdoing.  
Viewing the world in exclusively impartial, agent-neutral terms seems like “an excessive
demand to make of individuals whose perspective on the world is inherently complex and
includes a strong subjective component.”   This is the intuition behind Markovits’ critique of the91
hegemony of third-personal morality.  Indeed in many cases involving family members and other
close relationships, agent-neutral reasons strike many people as particular thin grounds for
explaining altruistic behavior.   Markovits’ claim is not just about motivation.  In his view,92
ethical value is a property of an agent’s practical identity.  “[T]he destruction of a person’s
integrity involves a great loss.”   Even granting that integrity is a source of value, and its93
destruction represents a great loss, more is needed to establish that integrity is the only source of
ethical value.  The effect of Markovits’ exclusive focus on the agent’s perspective is, ironically,
to create a hegemony of first-personal morality over the interests of others, which presumably
creates value as well.  In order to defend this hegemony, it is necessary to offer reasons that
matter to all affected persons, not just to the agent.  Otherwise Jim and the innocent victims seem
to be talking past each other.  Jim says, in effect, “Don’t you see — I cannot shoot one of you
because that would involve me in a relationship of authorship with wrongdoing.”  The twenty
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terrified potential victims respond, “Don’t you see?  For you to keep your hands clean and refuse
the captain’s bargain is to condemn nineteen of us to a needless death.  Why are you so important
that you can decide to preserve your own innocence at our expense?”  I do not mean to caricature
this conversation — the problem of representing personal and impartial perspectives in ethical
deliberation is an extremely subtle one.  The capacity to view the world from both a personal and
an impersonal point of view may even be the central problem for ethical theory, as Thomas Nagel
argues in The View from Nowhere.  In my view, however, one should resist the temptation of
finessing this problem by creating absolute priority rules — either ignoring the effect of impartial
values on the agent’s personal integrity or using integrity as a trump over the interests of others,
represented in impartial terms.  Both agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons matter in ethics,
and there is unfortunately no decision procedure that avoids the complexity of harmonizing these
two perspectives in deliberation.  
V. Integrity and the Conflict Between Ordinary and Institutional Values.
A. Political Roles and Dirty Hands.
Representing clients is essentially a political activity, in that lawyers assert and defend
rights that are created and enforced by the power of the state.  Lawyers enable clients to make use
of the law, which in turn enables people to live together in conditions of relative peace and
stability, despite deep and persistent disagreement about all sorts of issues, practical and moral. 
Because we disagree but also share an interest in working together on common projects, we find
  See Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role:  A Defense, A Problem, and Some94
Possibilities, 1986 AM . B. FOUND . RES. J. 613.  
  BERNARD W ILLIAMS, IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE DEED:  REALISM  AND MORALISM  IN POLITICAL95
ARGUMENT (Geoffrey Hawthorne ed. 2005).  
  Id. at 126-27.96
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it necessary to rely on political mechanisms to establish a provisional resolution of conflict.  In
order to create this settlement, it is necessary that the law preclude reference to the ordinary
moral considerations that were the subject of disagreement.  Lawyers who interpret cases,
statutes, and regulations to permit or forbid their clients’ activities, and who assist their clients in
accomplishing various ends, should not be guided by the ordinary moral reasons that would
otherwise apply, qua moral agent, to a person acting in a non-professional capacity.  This is not
amoralism, as some defenders of the lawyer’s traditional role have argued,  but the appropriate94
recognition of institutional moral reasons for action, related to the social value of the law as
providing a framework for co-existence and cooperation.  
The distinctiveness of the law as a reason for action raises the possibility that ordinary
and institutional moral domains are conceptually distinct.  In a volume of posthumously
published papers, Bernard Williams develops the argument that political moralism is
wrongheaded.   By “moralism” Williams means the view that political action is essentially95
applied moral reasoning; he contrasts this with the realist (as in Realpolitik) position that politics
is a distinctive mode in which humans relate to one another in a way that is fundamentally
practical, but also has the effect of coercing people to do something that they may believe is not
right.   A different way of drawing this distinction might be between different conceptions of the96
  See STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND EXPERIENCE 162-65 (1989); Max Weber, Politics as a97
Vocation, in FROM  MAX WEBER:  ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY  77, 125-26 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. 1946).  
  Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM  MAX WEBER 77, 123 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills, trans.98
and ed., 1946) (emphasis in original).  
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good within ethics.  For example, one might contrast the Christian conception of good as
holiness with a very different conception of good, associated with Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Max
Weber, which conceives of good (at least for politicians) as cunning, strength, resoluteness, the
ability to improvise unconstrained by principles, and where necessary, violence and
ruthlessness.   Weber points the point starkly in a passage from his essay Politics as a Vocation: 97
[H]e who lets himself in for politics, that is, for power and force as means,
contracts with diabolical powers and for his action it is not true that good can
follow only from good and evil only from evil, but that often the opposite is true. 
Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.98
Lawyers are not Machiavellian princes, of course, and their involvement in wrongdoing is not
generally necessary to avert a catastrophe on a par with an invasion or siege.  In a more modest
way, however, representing clients and doing things on their behalf may involve a lawyer in what
she sincerely believes to be wrongdoing, but which the client is legally entitled to do. 
Williams can be read as making either a strong or a weak claim about the relationship
between the domains of political and moral value.  The strong claim would be that these values
are incommensurable because they are formally distinct.  Thomas Nagel argues, for example, that
the human capacity to view the world from a variety of perspectives creates a “fragmentation” of
values into formally different types:
  Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 128, 134 (1979). 99
  See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955).  100
  Id. at 14-17; see also MORTIM ER R. KADISH &  SANFORD H. KADISH , D ISCRETION TO D ISOBEY:  A  STUDY101
OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM  LEGAL RULES 27 (1973) (distinguishing between reasons the a person may recognize
as bearing on her actions qua person, and those which can be taken into account in deciding how to act within a
professional role).
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The capacity to view the world simultaneously from the point of view of one’s
relations to others, from the point of view of one’s life extended through time,
from the point of view of everyone at once, and finally from the detached
viewpoint often described as the view sub specie aeternitatis is one of the marks
of humanity.  This complex capacity is an obstacle to simplification.  99
Williams might be relying on a formal distinction between institutional and pre-institutional
perspectives for ethical evaluation.  In that case these values would be literally incommensurable,
in that there would be no criterion with respect to which they could be compared.  However,
Williams might be making a weaker point, namely that there is a way to compare ordinary and
institutional values, but that institutional values must be understood as preempting consideration
of ordinary values.  One way to make this kind of claim about different domains of value is to
distinguish between the justification of a practice, which relies on ordinary moral values, and the
justification of “moves” within a practice, which would rely on the norms of the practice itself,
i.e. institutional values.   In Rawls’s example of promising, the norms of the practice of100
promising may preempt the actor from taking into account reasons that would otherwise count in
an all-things-considered deliberation.   This does not mean that the values that would go into101
the all-things-considered evaluation are formally distinct from, or incommensurable with the
institutional values.  Rather, there is a moral reason to recognize the institution of promising,
even though that institution can only fulfill its function if its norms preempt all-things-considered
  See Michael Walzer, Political Action:  The Problem of Dirty Hands, 1 PHIL. &  PUB. AFF. 160, 161102
(1973) (“a particular act of government . . . may be exactly the right thing to do in utilitarian terms and yet leave the
man who does it guilty of a moral wrong”); Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 54, 61
(1981) (“In some cases the claims of the political reasons are proximate enough, and enough of the moral kind, to
enable one to say that there is a moral justification for that particular political act, a justification which has
outweighed the moral reasons against it.  Even so, that can still leave the moral remainder, the uncancelled moral
disagreeableness I have referred to.”); Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 75, 82-83
(1979).   
  Williams, Politics and Moral Character, supra note ___, at 57.  103
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moral judgments.  
Whether the ordinary and institutional domains create incommensurable values, or
whether it is the case that institutional values ultimately derive their force from considerations
that have weight in the ordinary moral domain, the existence of these two domains creates the
possibility of justified wrongdoing or, as it is called in political philosophy, the problem of dirty
hands.   The “dirtiness” of the agent’s hands is a function of being able to evaluate an act from102
multiple perspectives — such as institutional and ordinary moral values, or agent-neutral and
agent-relative considerations.  In the Jim and the Indians problem, Jim may believe that he is
justified (or even required) by agent-neutral moral considerations to shoot one of the prisoners,
yet may nevertheless believe himself to have engaged in wrongdoing from the standpoint of his
own ground project of avoiding violence.  Similarly, because of the law’s preclusive effect on
ordinary moral reasoning, lawyers are morally required to do things “that honourable and
scrupulous people might, prima facie at least, be disinclined to do,”  even if those things are103
justified on the basis of agent-neutral reasons such as the importance of protecting the rights of
clients.  The lawyer who engages in a legally obligatory vigorous defense of a client may do
things that would be evaluated as lying or abusing in ordinary moral terms.  The lawyer, and Jim,
  See Markovits, supra note ___, at 226-28, 261-62 (arguing that, even if the adversary system is justified104
as a means to impartially determine and protect the legal rights of citizens, lawyers still have to ask whether they are
justified in first-personal terms in committing what would ordinarily be described as moral vices, such as lying and
subverting justice). 
  In a helpful overview presentation at the Auckland conference, Greg Cooper suggested that theories of105
legal ethics can be evaluated in terms of the extent to which they solve the problem of zeal and the problem of
integrity.  The problem of zeal refers to the capacity of a theory to capture what in legal terms is known as the agency
nature of the lawyer-client relationship — that is, the right of the client to direct the lawyer’s activities and to pursue
her own lawful ends using the lawyer as an instrument to attaining those ends.  In the American law of lawyering, the
agency relationship is defined as follows:  “[A] lawyer must, in matters within the scope of the representation,
proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
consultation.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW  GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16(1) (2000).  The problem of integrity,
on the other hand, refers to the ability within a theory of legal ethics to take account of the perspective of the lawyer,
who remains a moral agent — as opposed to being legally an agent of the client — and who wishes to respect the
demands of morality.  (The problem becomes particularly one of integrity of one represents the demands of morality
in Korsgaard’s or Markovits’ terms, as being true to one’s practical identity or moral character.)  One of Cooper’s
insights was that theories tend to do well with respect to one or the other of these problems, but seldom (if ever)
solve both simultaneously.  The theory I present here, which is strongly influenced by the ethics of political action,
expressly trades off integrity for zeal.  In my view, the legally constituted attorney-client relationship creates moral
reasons for the lawyer to serve the law and the client’s lawful ends.  If the lawyer has constructed a practical identity
in which this sort of action is important to her, then the lawyer’s integrity may be unaffected.  But a lawyer who does
not incorporate this notion of lawyering into her practical identity may still be morally required to carry out the
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may be unable to satisfy the requirements of both domains of value, and therefore face the
prospect of committing wrongs in either ordinary or institutional moral terms.  
Naturally, one might expect a practitioner to feel alienated or agonized as the result of an
institutional demand to do something that the agent would regard as wrong from the standpoint
of her commitments and ground projects.  Although the legal system and the social role of
lawyers may be justified in some impartial, third-person sense, from the point of view of the
individual practitioner it may be experienced as a direct relationship of connection with, or
authorship of wrongdoing.   This is an important objection, but I have a hard time imagining104
how a system that is designed to handle moral conflict can function without the participation of
officials and quasi-officials who in some sense participate in acts that may be experienced as
wrongdoing from a first-person point of view.   Eliminating all connection with what the lawyer105
demands of her role, notwithstanding her lack of any integrity-based commitment to fulfilling those ends.  
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believes would be wrongdoing in ordinary moral life — that is, seeking some kind of hyper-
purity within an institutional role — is possible only at the expense of undermining the capacity
of the institution to realize the goods for which it is constituted.  Paradoxically, then, a lawyer
who seeks to have no authorship relationship whatsoever with wrongdoing also commits moral
wrongdoing, only this time in respect of the institutional reasons for respecting a valuable social
institution.  Integrity in ethics, at least the way Markovits understands it in terms of avoiding
authorship of wrongdoing, belongs to a morality emphasizing innocence and purity, but at the
expense of the ability to protect the rights of third parties whose interests are affected by the
lawyer’s refusal to get her hands dirty.  
B. Moral Constraints on Ground Projects.
A different kind of problem with appealing to integrity as the source of normativity is that
it seems all too contingent.  If a lawyer happens to have a set of commitments that is inconsistent
with abusing and harassing others, then it is possible to gain some normative and motivational
purchase in arguing that she should not act like one of the well known examples of obnoxious
lawyers familiar from legal ethics casebooks.  But this does not seem to offer much
argumentative leverage against someone with a different ground project.  The contingency of
ground projects is not only a basis for skepticism about morality, but also creates difficulties for
arguments within ethics, to someone with a different set of ground projects.  If the source of
ethical value is primarily to be understood in agent-relative terms, there still seems to be an open
  KORSGAARD, supra note ___, at 103.  106
  Id. at 113.  107
  Id. at 129. 108
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question (back to Moore!) as to why morally one ought to act on the basis of one’s practical
identity or ground projects.  Korsgaard’s neo-Kantian argument makes some progress toward
answering this question, in that it shows that the normativity of one’s practical identity is a
function of the way in which it provides a reasoned basis — a criterion for choice — upon which
the rational will can act.  But just as Moore’s open question argument asks why the recognition
that something is good should move us to act to promote it, we can ask what it is about forming a
practical identity that confers moral ought-to-be-doneness upon those actions. 
The answer to the open question must be that some practical identities are better to adopt
than others, for agent-neutral ethical reasons.  Korsgaard faces this objection squarely:
The question how exactly an agent should conceive her practical identity, the
question which law she should be to herself, is not settled by the arguments I have
given.  So moral obligation is not yet on the table.106
And later she admits that “there is still a deep element of relativism in the system.”   But she107
believes the problem of relativism can be addressed by constraining the formation of practical
identities with reference to universal moral values.  Standing behind various particular practical
identities (parent, psychologist, lawyer, and so on) is a general identity, “our identity as human,
that is, as reflective animals who need to have practical conceptions of our identity in order to act
and to live.”   One cannot lead a recognizably human existence with a commitment to viewing108
  Id. at 125.  109
  Id. at 121.  110
  Id. 117 (“The conception of moral wrongness as we now understand it belongs to the world we live in,111
the one brought about by the Enlightenment, where one’s identity is one’s relation to humanity itself.”).  See also
Herman, supra note ___, at 40 (“The attachment to morality is supposed to be unconditional.  But this is compatible
with the conditions of character:  the moral agent is to be one who has a conception of himself as someone who will
not pursue his projects in ways that are morally impermissible.”)
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oneself in these highly abstract terms.  “Moral identity does not swamp other forms of identity:
no one is simply a moral agent and nothing more.”   Practical identities are a specification or an109
instantiation of the general identity of humanity, and acquire ethical value only insofar as they
embody respect for the value of humanity.  Valuing oneself as a human agent (and forming a
practical identity that is reason-giving) involves valuing others in that way as well.   It would be110
incoherent to value oneself as a rational agent but think that other rational agents had no value.  111
This response to the problem of relativism seems right to me, but interestingly it comes at
the cost of surrendering much of the agent-relativity of her ethical system.  Korsgaard’s neo-
Kantian approach turns out to be primarily Kantian, and only secondarily “neo-”.  It shows the
importance of some particularized practical identities in the motivational lives of people, and
usefully combines “is” and “ought” statements via thickly described roles.  Why should a lawyer
take direction from her client, vigorously assert her interests against those of others, and seek to
achieve her client’s lawful objectives?  Because that is what it means to be a lawyer.  Failing
with reference to any of these obligations means being less than faithful to the role which the
person has agreed to occupy.  The reason-giving force of ethical obligations within the role is
explained by the incorporation of the role into a person’s self-description, as an explanation for
  Herman, supra note ___, at 39.  112
  Id. (“The moral agent knows in advance that neither his identification of himself with a project nor the113
(true) fact that if he is unable to act as he wants his life will be emptied of meaning for him is sufficient to justify his
acting against (serious) moral requirements.”).  
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why she does the things she does —  “because I’m a lawyer, and that’s what lawyers do.”  As a
metaethics for lawyers, this makes a great deal of sense.  Still, it is not as strongly agent-relative
as it may have seemed at first glance, because of Korsgaard’s insistence that practical identities
must be given up if they are inconsistent with the (agent-neutral) value of humanity.  Practical
identity and its unity over time — i.e. integrity — play a crucial role in motivation and
justification, but they are not the last word.  Integrity is always checked by some impartial value. 
Significantly, this impartial value enters the picture only at a fairly high level of
generality.  One must ask whether one’s ground projects are consistent with the value of
humanity, but as long as they are, one is not further required to ask whether, in every case, one’s
actions realize some impartial value.  It is permissible, and may even be necessary as a condition
for being an agent, to answer particular questions of what should be done with reference to one’s
practical identity or ground projects.  As Barbara Herman usefully suggests, the Kantian notion
of the universal value of humanity enters into morality as a regulative ideal, ruling out certain
projects as impermissible, but that does not mean that an agent “is not allowed only to act only
on condition that his action will realize some impartial value in the world.”   In a case of112
serious conflict between one’s ground projects and moral value — understood in terms of the
universal value of humanity — maintaining one’s integrity is not a sufficient reason to act
contrary to impartial value.   However, if there is a plurality of morally “eligible” ground113
  APPLBAUM , supra note ___, at 91-93.  114
  Id. at 99.  115
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projects, integrity in the sense of consistency with one’s commitments is a sufficient reason to act
in a given case.   
I have sketched out what the incorporationist solution would look like, relying on the
theoretical works of Korsgaard and Herman.  Even if this approach is promising as a theoretical
matter, it remains to be seen whether the ground projects of lawyers are consistent with the
ethical value of humanity.  Imagine the justification offered by a hypothetical public defender,
who seeks to explain why it is ethically permissible to cross-examine (and even rudely badger)
truthful witnesses, make arguments to the court with weak factual and legal support, and seek the
acquittal of a factually guilty client.  The project suggested previously of defending the oppressed
and struggling against injustice seems as though it would be consistent with the value of
humanity, but describing one’s ground project in this way seems to beg the question against a
critic who would describe the lawyer as engaged in a project of deception, harassment, and
abuse.  The description of the ground project here, in either institutional or ordinary values, is
prior to the ethical evaluation of the project as a suitable object of commitment.  Arthur
Applbaum has argued that descriptions in ordinary moral terms persist, so that the lawyer cannot
avoid ascriptions such as deceiver and abuser.   He also argues that the concept of a practice (or114
an institution) does not itself impose constraints on the rules that might constitute and regulate
the practice or institution.   That may be true as a conceptual matter, about the notion of a115
practice or institution, but by analogy with the neo-Kantian approach of Korsgaard and Herman,
  See supra note ___, and accompanying text.  I applied this argument to the problem of client selection in116
legal ethics, in W. Bradley Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics:  The Problem of Client
Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987 (2006).  
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a legal ethics theorist might contend that although the concept of a practice does not create moral
constraints, the concept of a morally worthy practice does.  As I argued earlier, with reference to
Rawls’ practice conception of rules, moral constraints are built in at the level of justifying the
practice as a whole, leaving to the rules of the practice the evaluation of particular actions taken
by a practitioner.   The “slipperiness” of descriptions noted by Applbaum can therefore be116
mitigated by inquiring into the justification of the practice at this more general level.  If the
practice of representing criminal defendants is justified, then the actions taken by a public
defender are appropriately described in evaluatively neutral or positive terms (e.g. cross-
examining), instead of evaluatively negative terms (e.g. humiliating or deceiving).  
Again, one of the central claims of the neo-Kantian approach to integrity is that an agent’s
commitments must ultimately withstand scrutiny from the impartial, agent-neutral standpoint of
the value of humanity.  Markovits, by contrast, would allow much less of a role for agent-neutral
considerations to play a role in the evaluation of ground projects.  It is hard to find in his account
any description of an ethical “eligibility” analysis that is analytically prior to the evaluation of
actions as warranted or not warranted by consistency with one’s ground projects.  In his
reconstruction of the Jim and the Indians problem, Jim is a pacifist, or at least someone who is
fortunate enough to live in a stable country in the developed world and thus have no need to
consider whether it is necessary to kill innocent people to accomplish some political end.  In
  Markovits, supra note ___, at 254.117
  Id. at 255.  118
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Jim’s “natural habitat,”  he holds fast to a personal identity that precludes shooting the one117
innocent captive.  That is well and good, but the lack of any real foundation of Jim’s project in
impartial morality is vividly demonstrated by Markovits’ new character of Jane, who was not
present in Williams’ original telling of this tale.  Jane has a different natural habitat.  She is a
citizen of the society which also includes the rebels and the counterinsurgency forces, and is
pursuing political liberation for her people, despite knowing that her cause will occasionally
demand violence.  In a remarkable passage, Markovits explains how her environment has created
in Jane a very different personal identity from Jim’s:  
Although Jane despises killing innocents, her ethical circumstances do not allow
her the luxury of including “never kill innocents” in her own ethical projects. 
Jane’s own self-originating first-person ethical ideals are much more hard-hearted
than this. . . .  [T]hey include maintaining the ruthlessness and self-control needed
for making difficult and unpleasant choices, including the choice to sacrifice
innocents, in pursuit of these goals [of overthrowing the military government].118
As I have noted, political action may sometimes involve justified wrongdoing.  The problem is
not that Jane is an inconceivable figure or someone whose actions are clearly unjustifiable. 
Rather, the problem is the pattern of justification Markovits gives for Jane’s decision to accept
the offer, and shoot one innocent captive.  Jane can shoot the one captive, while Jim cannot,
because Jane’s natural environment has selected for ruthless, hard-hearted characters who are
capable of shooting innocents.  
  Railton, Moral Realism , supra note ___, at 107-08.119
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Markovits would have us evaluate Jim as not justified in shooting one of the captives, and
Jane as justified, solely because of the difference in their environments.  There is no room in this
analysis for the prior question, emphasized by Korsgaard and Herman, of whether the practical
identities of Jim and Jane are consistent with the value of humanity.  Granting that people grow
up in different circumstances, and some are better able than others to shoot innocent people, this
un-asked question lurks in Markovits’ Jane story.  I believe that question can only be asked from
an agent-neutral point of view.  Otherwise the perspective of the innocent victims drops out of
the picture entirely, and we are left with the fairly solipsistic question from Jim’s point of view,
of whether he is willing to accept a relationship of authorship with the harm to the innocent
captive.  The answer to the question from the agent-neutral point of view must appeal to
impartial ethical concepts such as values, consequences, rights, or virtues, not simply the
circumstances in which the agent happened to grow up.  To simply accede to the influence of
one’s environment would be the very antithesis of acting autonomously.  119
If we do not simply take identities and ground projects as a given, but subject them to
impartial ethical scrutiny, then Markovits’ theory runs into a serious difficulty.  His overarching
professional ground project of fidelity to client ends and effacement of critical scrutiny by
lawyers, may not be justifiable in impartial terms to affected institutions and individuals in
society.  The ideal of self-effacement means uncritically lending support to the ends of clients
who may intend to cause serious harms, or at least may be indifferent to the harms resulting from
their actions.  To take one example from recent legal ethics scandals, high-level managers in the
  See, e.g., BETHANY MCLEAN &  PETER ELKIND , THE SM ARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM :  THE AM AZING RISE120
AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON  (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?  A Capsule Social and
Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004); Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: 
The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003);  Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s
Done:  The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM . L. REV. 1236 (2003).  
  These quotes are from Markovits, supra note ___, at 273-74.  121
  See 1 BOSWELL’S LIFE OF SAM UEL JOHNSON  471 (G.B. Hill, ed., 1935).  The “refutation” in the original122
quote was of Berkeley’s idealism, and was supposedly accomplished by kicking a stone.  
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finance and accounting departments at Enron were interested in manipulating the company’s
financial statements to hide substantial losses and conceal indebtedness, thereby artificially
inflating the company’s stock price.  Lawyers worked extensively on every aspect of the
transactions the company entered into, in order to realize these ends.   If they had asked hard120
questions, the lawyers would have realized that many of these transactions relied on aggressive
interpretations of the accounting rules that virtually any impartial accountant (that is, one not
receiving millions of dollars in fees from Enron) would regard as illegitimate.  Markovits
recommends that lawyers in that situation “make up [their] mind about nothing,” entertain all
sides of the argument sympathetically, be particularly keen to see things from the client’s point of
view, change positions as the client requires, refuse to judge for themselves, suppress their own
ideas, and “self-effacingly empathize with whatever claims the client places before [them].”   It121
is tempting to quote Samuel Johnson, recount the story of the collapse of Enron, and proclaim, “I
refute Markovits thus!”   It seems almost self-evident that self-effacement is a recipe for ethical122
disaster if followed scrupulously by lawyers.  In fact, much of the public outcry against lawyers,
after scandals like the Enron collapse and the disclosure of legal opinions justifying the torture of
detainees captured in Afghanistan and Iraq, is directed at lawyers who acted merely as facilitators
of their clients’ goals, without exercising judgment with respect to the legal and factual merits of
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their clients’ positions.  Reasonable people may differ over how much responsibility lawyers
should have as gatekeepers, and what evidence triggers a duty to investigate and rectify client 
wrongdoing, but apart from the context of criminal defense representation, the ideal of self-
effacement seems to fail the test of impartial justification.  
VI. Conclusion.
The turn to integrity in legal ethics is intended to mitigate the conflicts between ordinary
and institutional values that arise in the lives of practicing lawyers.  The most promising
approach is the incorporationist solution, which relies on the adoption by agents of a ground
projects that coincide with the values that constitute the professional role.  Personal integrity thus
bridges the normative gap between these domains which otherwise would raise the problem of
dirty hands.  This solution works only as long as the agent’s ground projects can be justified in
terms that are acceptable to (or cannot reasonably be rejected by) those who potentially are
adversely affected by the agent’s actions within the professional role.  There is accordingly an
agent-neutral dimension to the evaluation of ground projects, including professional roles.  Once
a project is justified at a general level, it gives agent-relative reasons for a person to do those
things that are distinctive of the role.  There are a lot of conditions on this pattern of ethical
justification — a person must have a suitable ground project that coincides with the legitimate
requirements of a professional role — but those lawyers whose personal commitments are
ethically justified and in alignment with the requirements of the role may escape many of the
tensions created by the divergence between ordinary and institutional values.  
